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Abstract
We consider a dynamic version of sender–receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an
irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple charac-
terization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions,
the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium pay-
offs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive
compatibility condition for the sender.
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1. Introduction
Since [8], sender–receiver games, or cheap-talk games, have become a natural framework
for studying issues of information transmission between a privately informed ‘expert’ and an
uninformed decision maker, where the two parties have non-aligned interests.
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equilibrium has been studied extensively, when ‘talk’ takes place prior to the decision stage.
While [8], see also [14], have focused on the case where communication is limited to a single
costless and non-verifiable message from the sender to the receiver, more recent papers have
shown that this restriction is not innocuous, and have characterized the equilibrium outcomes for
general cheap-talk games, see [18,2]. This line of work has been motivated by numerous concrete
situations. We refer to [19,11,23] for a discussion of these applications.
The present work is motivated by the following observation. Whether the sender is a financial
advisor who provides advice to a client, an expert who is consulted on a project, or a referee on
a project/person, the situation often calls for a dynamic approach. Indeed, the financial advisor
provides advice on a series of investments, and the expert and the referee may be consulted on
successive, related projects.
Such a situation is analyzed in [13]. They assume that the sender repeatedly sends messages,
the receiver repeatedly makes decisions, while the state of the world remains fixed throughout.
Within the framework of [8] (continuum of states/messages), they show that, for some specifica-
tions on the initial distribution on states, (necessarily complex) equilibria exist, that achieve full
revelation of the state of the world in finite time.
We here deal with situations in which the state of the world may change through time. Specifi-
cally, we assume that the successive states form an irreducible Markov chain over some finite set.
In every stage, the sender issues a message/recommendation, and the receiver makes a decision.
States are only known to the sender, and payoffs only depend on the current state and on the
receiver’s decision, but not on the message sent by the sender.
Since states are autocorrelated, any information disclosed in stage n provides valuable in-
formation in later stages as well, as in [13]. Yet, since the Markov chain is irreducible, this
information becomes eventually valueless.
Intuitively, the inter-temporal situation puts some restrictions on the players’ behavior. As an
illustration, the opinion of an expert who systematically provides laudatory reports will eventu-
ally come to be discounted, if not ignored, since the decision maker is aware of the fact that the
time-average report of the quality of people/projects should reflect the invariant measure of the
states of the world. On the other hand, an expert who genuinely provides accurate information to
promote efficiency, but sees that the decision maker only acts in his interests, may become wary
and may stop to provide valuable information to the decision maker. As is well known from
repeated games, the sender may indeed provide powerful incentives by conditioning his future
communication policy on the behavior of the decision maker. Similar insights already appear in
the literature on dynamic contracting, see [5,6,4].
Our paper relates to the recent and growing literature on incomplete information games, in
which the uncertainty evolves according to a stochastic process. Examples of such papers in-
clude, e.g., [1,9,20–22,24,15] and, especially, [10]. We provide a characterization of the limit
set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when players are very patient. Our main findings are
the following. We first show (Theorem 1) that a feasible payoff vector is a (limit) equilibrium
payoff as soon as the following two conditions are met. On the one hand, the payoff of the
receiver should be at least his babbling equilibrium payoff. This condition is an individual ra-
tionality condition. Indeed, the latter payoff is equal to the receiver’s minmax payoff in the
dynamic game since the receiver has the option to ignore the announcements of the sender. On
the other hand, the sender’s payoff should satisfy an incentive compatibility condition, which
reflects the fact that the sender has the option of substituting artificially generated states to the
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the true ones. As it turns out, this incentive constraint takes the form of finitely many linear
inequalities.
In the corresponding equilibria, with high probability the sender truthfully reports the current
state most of the time while the receiver responds in a stationary manner to the announcements
of the sender, and checks that the distribution of these announcements is consistent with the
invariant measure of the underlying Markov chain.1
We next show (Theorem 2) that the converse inclusion holds under some additional condition
on the Markov chain, which we call Assumption A: any limit equilibrium payoff must satisfy the
individual rational condition and the specific version of the incentive compatibility requirement
of Theorem 1.
A noteworthy consequence is that, under Assumption A, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs
does not depend on how successive states are correlated, nor on fine details of the sequence of
states, but only on the invariant measure. It is also irrelevant whether the sender learns some, or
even all, of the realization of the future states in advance. In particular, the set of equilibrium
payoffs can be computed as if successive states were independent.
Our results are valid for a large (open) class of payoff functions for the static game, but not
for all of them. More precisely, we prove that for generic payoff functions (and under Assump-
tion A), either our results hold, or all equilibria of the repeated game are payoff-equivalent to
babbling equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3 we
explain most insights by means of an example. The main results appear in Section 4, together
with an illustration. Proofs are discussed in Section 5 and Appendices A, B, C, and D. Additional
results and comments are provided in Section 6. Appendices A, B, C, and D contain all proof
details.
2. Model
We study dynamic sender–receiver games, in which the state of the world changes through
time. At each stage n  1, the sender (player 1) observes the current state of the world sn ∈ S,
and makes an announcement an ∈ A. Upon observing an, the receiver (player 2) chooses an
action bn ∈ B . The current action bn, together with the current state sn, determines the utility
vector u(sn, bn) ∈ R2 at stage n. Only the action bn is then publicly disclosed. We thus main-
tain the assumption that payoffs are not observed. The two players share a common discount
factor δ.
We assume throughout that the set of states S, the set of messages A, and the set of actions
B are finite. We also assume that there are at least as many messages as states. This assumption
ensures that the only motives for concealing the state are strategic. We thus leave aside situations
in which, due to capacity constraints, the sender might be forced to choose which feature of the
state to reveal. For simplicity, we will actually assume throughout that the set A of messages
coincides with the set S of states. (As will be seen, this assumption is without loss of generality
in our setup.)
1 While this is reminiscent of the revelation principle, we stress that no revelation principle applies in our setting.
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We assume that the states (sn) follow a Markov chain over S, with transition function p(· | ·),
which is irreducible and aperiodic.2 The Markov chain therefore admits a unique invariant mea-
sure m ∈ (S). For convenience, we assume that the first state, s1, is drawn according to m. This
ensures that the law of sn is equal to m, for every n 1.
In this setup, a strategy of the sender maps past and current realized states and past play into
a mixed message, and is thus a function σ :⋃n0(S × A × B)n × S → (A), while a strategy
of the receiver is a function τ :⋃n0(A×B)n → (B). A stationary strategy of the receiver is
a function y : A → (B) with the interpretation that the receiver chooses his action according to
y(· | a) ∈ (B) whenever told a ∈ A.
Our goal is to study to what extent the dynamic structure of the game affects the equilib-
rium outcomes. Formally, we aim at providing a characterization of the limit set of sequential
equilibrium payoffs, and at understanding equilibrium behavior when players are very patient.
3. An example
We here illustrate our main results by means of a simple example. There are two states, S =
{L,R}, and two actions for the receiver, l and r . Successive states are independent and equally
likely. Payoffs are given by the two tables in Fig. 1, where c is a fixed parameter with c ∈ (1,2).
The sender and the receiver are respectively players 1 and 2.
The one-shot information transmission game has a unique equilibrium, in which the receiver
plays r with probability 1. To see this, note that the sender strictly prefers action r over action
l, no matter what the state is. Thus, at equilibrium, all messages that are sent with positive prob-
ability induce the same mixed action by the receiver. This constant mixed action, being always
ex post optimal for the receiver, is therefore also ex ante optimal. It must thus assign probability
one to action r .
All equilibria in the one-shot game are therefore babbling equilibria.3 Plainly, the dynamic
game admits a babbling equilibrium, in which the sender repeatedly makes the same announce-
ment, the receiver treats the announcements as being non-informative, and plays r in every stage.
Note that the receiver can always choose to ignore the announcements of the sender and to play
r in every stage, thereby getting 1. As a result, the babbling equilibrium is the worst equilibrium
for the receiver, in both the one-shot game and the dynamic game.
We claim that the dynamic game has equilibrium payoffs that are arbitrarily close to ( 2+c2 ,
3
2 ),
which is the best possible outcome for the receiver. In particular, and in contrast with the receiver,
there are equilibrium payoffs for the sender that are below the babbling equilibrium payoff. Here
is the intuition. The sender announces the true state at every stage. The receiver listens to the
announcements of the sender, and plays l when told L, and r when told R. To prevent the sender
from announcing R in every stage, the receiver monitors the announcements of the sender, and
2 That is, for any two states s, t ∈ S, and for every N ∈ N large enough, the probability of moving from s to t in exactly
N stages is positive.
3 In the sense that the action of the receiver is independent of the message sent by the sender.
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should announce both states equally often, the expected payoff of the sender is highest when he
reports truthfully.
While this intuition is simple, formalizing it into an equilibrium of the discounted game is
not straightforward. Indeed, because payoffs are discounted, the sender may have a preference to
send at first the message R more frequently.
We start with a simple construction that yields an equilibrium payoff distinct from (2,1).
Assume that the discount factor satisfies δ > 4−2c3−c , and consider the following strategy profile.
• At odd stages, the sender announces truthfully the current stage, and the receiver plays l if
told L, and r if told R.
• At even stages, the sender announces a constant message, and the receiver plays the action
that he did not play in the previous stage.
• If the receiver deviates, both players switch to the babbling equilibrium forever.
Under this strategy profile, expected payoffs are equal to 11+δ (
2+c
2 + δ 5+c4 ) for the sender and
1
1+δ (
3
2 + 34δ) for the receiver. Because a deviation of the receiver is followed by the babbling
equilibrium, which yields 1 to the receiver, and because the (conditional) expected payoff of
the receiver is at least 1 in every stage, no deviation of the receiver is profitable. Regarding the
sender, it is sufficient to show that he cannot profit by deviating in any block of two stages. In
such a block the sender has two possible deviations: to announce L in the first stage of the block
when the true state is R, and to announce R in the first stage of the block when the true state
is L. In the former case, he gets 1 at the first stage and 2 in the second (instead of 2 at the first
stage and 1+c2 at the second stage if he announces truthfully). In the latter case, he gets 2 at the
first stage and 1+c2 at the second stage (instead of c at the first stage and 2 at the second stage if
he announces truthfully). The choice of δ ensures that none of these deviations is profitable.
To get payoffs closer to ( 2+c2 ,
3
2 ), we will be relying on a slightly more complex construction.
We let the size 2N of a block be large enough, so that a law of large numbers will apply. Once
N is fixed, we let the discount factor δ be high enough, so that the contribution of any individual
block to the overall discounted payoff is very small.
We first describe a pure strategy τ of the receiver. In each block (unless if the receiver has
deviated earlier), the receiver listens to the sender’s announcements, plays l if told L, r if told R,
until the number of announcements of either L or R exceeds N . When this is the case, the
receiver stops listening to the sender’s announcements, and repeats the least frequent action until
the end of the current block.4 In a sense, the sender is restricted to announcing both states equally
often in any given block of 2N stages. As such, the intuition here is similar to some extent to the
one behind the linking mechanism of [17] and, even more, to the analysis in [10].5
If indeed the sender reports truthfully the current state, there is a high probability that the
receiver will be listening to the sender most of the time, and the expected payoff is therefore
close to ( 2+c2 ,
3
2 ).
In contrast with the situation examined above, it need not be optimal for the sender to report
truthfully when facing τ . However, a crucial insight is that any best reply of the sender to τ must
4 An alternative construction, that we adopt in the general case, is for the receiver to generate a specific sequence of
fictitious announcements, and continue as if the sender’s announcements were equal to the fictitious ones.
5 The present analysis and the one in [10] were developed independently.
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reply achieves a payoff of at least, say, 2+c2 − ε. But since the receiver plays both actions l and
r equally likely on each block, this implies that with high probability the action of the receiver
matches the state, most of the time.
We let σ be any pure best reply of the sender to τ . On the equilibrium path, we let players
play according to σ and τ . By construction, the equilibrium property holds for the sender. To
deter the receiver from deviating, both players switch forever to the babbling equilibrium once a
deviation of the receiver is detected. Since the discount factor is high, the expected continuation
payoff of the receiver is close to 32 following any history, while the receiver gets a payoff of 1 (or
close to 1) if he deviates.
4. Main results
We here state and discuss two results on the limit set of equilibrium payoffs. Loosely speaking,
according to Theorem 1 all payoff vectors that are individually rational for the receiver and
incentive compatible for the sender are (asymptotically) equilibrium payoffs. Theorem 2 proves
the converse inclusion. Further results are provided in Section 6.
4.1. Theorem 1
We start with some notations. We denote by M⊂ (S × A) the set of copulas based on m;
that is, the set of distributions μ over S × A whose marginals on S and on A are both equal6
to m. The set M is defined by a finite number of linear inequalities, hence it is a compact convex
polyhedron, and in particular it has finitely many extreme points.
We denote by μ0 ∈M the specific distribution defined as μ0(s, s) = m(s) for each s ∈ S,
and μ0(s, a) = 0 if s = a. Under μ0, the messages and the states coincide a.s. Thus, the distri-
bution μ0 is the long-run average distribution of the sequence (sn, an)n when the sender reports
truthfully the current state.
Given a copula μ ∈M and a stationary strategy y : A → (B) we set
U(μ,y) :=
∑
s∈S,a∈A
μ(s, a)u
(
s, y(· | a)) ∈ R2,
where u(s, y(· | a)) =∑b∈B u(s, b)y(b | a). This is the expected payoff vector when the sender’s
report is drawn according to μ(· | s), and the receiver plays y.
We denote by
v2 := max
b∈B
∑
s∈S
m(s)u2(s, b) (1)
the babbling equilibrium payoff for the receiver.
Definition 1. Let E(M) denote the set of payoff vectors U(μ0, y), where y : A → (B), that
satisfy
C1. U1(μ0, y)U1(μ,y) for every μ ∈M, and
C2. U2(μ0, y) v2.
6 Recall that the set A of messages is a copy of the set S of states.
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C2 are strict. That is, Ê(M) is the set of vectors U(μ0, y), y : A → (B), such that
D1. U1(μ0, y) > U1(μ,y) for every μ ∈M, μ = μ0, and
D2. U2(μ0, y) > v2.
Note that condition D1 holds as soon as the inequality U1(μ0, y) > U1(μ,y) is satisfied for
each of the finitely many extreme points μ = μ0 of M.
We denote by SEδ the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs of the game with discount factor δ.
Our first main result, Theorem 1, shows that all payoffs in E(M) can be obtained as equilibrium
payoffs, provided that players are sufficiently patient.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists a public randomizing device, which outputs a (uniformly
distributed) number in [0,1] in every stage, after the announcement of the sender. If Ê(M) = ∅
then
E(M) ⊆ lim inf
δ→1SEδ.
Theorem 1 means that for every γ ∈ E(M) and for every ε > 0, there exists δ0 < 1 such that,
for every δ  δ0, the δ-discounted game has a sequential equilibrium payoff within ε of γ . The
proof7 of Theorem 1 is provided in Section 5.1.
Few comments are in order. The babbling payoff v2 is equal to the minmax value of the re-
ceiver in the dynamic game. Hence condition C2 in Definition 1 reads as an individual rationality
condition. Condition C1 is akin to an incentive compatibility condition: under the constraint that
the distribution of messages is equal to the distribution of states, truth-telling is optimal for the
sender. According to Theorem 1, any payoff vector U(μ0, y) that is incentive compatible for the
sender and individually rational for the receiver is an equilibrium payoff for δ large.
Our construction will have the somewhat surprising feature that the sender reports truthfully,
at least most of the time and with high probability. The intuition is reminiscent of the revelation
principle in mechanism design. Let an equilibrium (σ, τ ) be given. Consider the strategy profile
where the sender reports truthfully, and the receiver first computes the message that the strategy
σ would have sent, and next plays what τ would have played given this message. We argue
loosely that this new profile (when supplemented with threats) is an equilibrium. The key to the
argument is twofold. On the one hand, the sender can check that the receiver does indeed play
as prescribed, and does not use the additional information provided by the knowledge of the true
state. On the other hand, the threat of switching to the babbling equilibrium is effective because
the knowledge of the state at a given stage becomes eventually valueless in predicting distant
stages, because of the irreducibility property of the sequence of states. However, we stress that
no revelation principle applies in our setup and our equilibrium construction relies on the threat
that the sender will stop providing information following a deviation.
Theorem 1 relies on two assumptions. The public randomizing device can easily be dispensed
with, provided one slightly extends the communication options offered to the players. To be
7 We will actually prove the stronger statement that δ0 can be chosen to be independent of γ :
lim
δ→1 supγ∈E(M)
d(γ,SEδ) = 0.
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sender has reported a state. Under such an assumption, players can implement jointly controlled
lotteries as in [3], which can substitute the randomization device. Details are standard and omit-
ted. However, when instead communication is restricted to a single message sent by the sender,
then the existence of a public randomizing device is not without loss of generality; see Section 6.2
for an example.
Theorem 1 also requires Ê(M) to be non-empty. This is similar to the non-empty interior
type conditions which appear in Folk Theorems. Yet, we stress that our assumption is somewhat
stronger, since Ê(M) need not be equal to the relative interior of E(M), and the condition
that Ê(M) = ∅ is not generically satisfied. We provide a robust example where Ê(M) = ∅ and
elaborate further on this issue in Section 6.1.
It is not an easy task to rely on Definition 1 to check whether a given payoff vector U(μ,y)
belongs to E(M). Fortunately, it turns out that conditions C1 and D1 are equivalent to much
simpler conditions.
Lemma 1. Let y : A → (B) be given. Conditions C1 and D1 are respectively equivalent to
conditions C’1 and D’1 below.
C’1.
∑
s∈S u1(s, y(· | s))
∑
s∈S u1(s, y(· | φ(s))) for every permutation φ over S.
D’1.
∑
s∈S u1(s, y(· | s)) >
∑
s∈S u1(s, y(· | φ(s))) for every permutation φ over S that is not
the identity mapping.
The proof of Lemma 1 appears in Appendix A. Interestingly, conditions C’1 and D’1 do not
involve the invariant distribution m. The intuition is best explained in the case of two states, s0
and s1. Assume that the sender is considering mis-reporting the state, under the constraint that
the distribution of reports matches the invariant distribution m of the state. The only way to do
this is to report s1 instead of s0, as often as to report s0 instead of s1. Whether such a deviation
is profitable is equivalent to asking how the unweighted sum of the payoffs obtained in s0 when
reporting s1 and in s1 when reporting s0 compares to the unweighted sum of the payoffs obtained
in the two states when reporting truthfully.
4.2. Theorem 2
Our second main result provides the converse inclusion to that in Theorem 1. It requires one
substantive assumption on the behavior of the state, Assumption A below.
Assumption A. There exist non-negative numbers (αs)s∈S , with
∑
s∈S\{s¯} αs  1 (for every
s¯ ∈ S), such that p(s′ | s) = αs′ whenever s′ = s.
Assumption A is restrictive, yet it holds, e.g., in the following cases.
Assume first that changes in the state are due to shocks, which occur at random times. Once
drawn, the state remains constant until a shock occurs. The state is then drawn anew, according
to m. The inter-arrival times of the successive shocks are i.i.d. and follow a geometric distribu-
tion. In that case, Assumption A is met. Indeed, it suffices to set αt = π × m(t) for every t ∈ S,
where π is the per-stage probability of a shock. The parameter π is here a measure of the state
persistence. When π increases from 0 to 1, the situation evolves from one in which the state
remains constant through time, to a situation in which successive states are independent.
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Thus, Assumption A holds in the case of i.i.d. states.
Assumption A also holds in the benchmark case where there are only two possible states.
Indeed, denoting the two states by s1 and s2, it suffices to set α1 = p(s1 | s2) and α2 = p(s2 | s1).
In particular, it is satisfied in the models in [1,21,24].
As a further simple illustration, consider a symmetric random walk on three states. That is,
whenever in a state, the chain moves to each of the two other states with probability 12 . Again,
Assumption A is met, with αs = 12 for each s ∈ S.
Note that Assumption A implies that m(s) = αs(∑t∈S αt ) for every s ∈ S. This implies in par-
ticular that the Markov chain is reversible: m(s)p(s′ | s) = m(s′)p(s | s′) for all states s, s′ ∈ S,
and therefore P(sn = s, sn+1 = s′) = P(sn = s′, sn+1 = s) for each stage n ∈ N.
We denote by NEδ the set of (Nash) equilibrium payoffs in the game with discount factor δ.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption A holds. Then, for every δ < 1, one has
NEδ ⊆ E(M).
Provided that Ê(M) = ∅ and that Assumption A is met, Theorems 1 and 2 thus imply that the
set of sequential equilibrium payoffs SEδ converges to the set E(M) (as soon as a randomizing
device is available).
Note that the set M of copulas only depends on the invariant measure m, and not on finer
details of the transition function. A striking implication of the characterization is that, under As-
sumption A, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs only depends on the invariant measure m. In
particular, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs is the same as when the states are drawn indepen-
dently across stages. That is, the amount of state persistence is irrelevant for the determination
of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs.
If the initial state s were to remain fixed throughout the play, the game would fall into the
class of repeated games with incomplete information introduced by [3]. (This is the setup studied
in [13].) In this case, the limit set of discounted equilibrium payoffs, when δ goes to 1, is typically
not equal to E(M). Hence, there is a discontinuity in the limit set of equilibrium payoffs when
successive states become perfectly autocorrelated.8
By contrast, for a fixed discount factor, the set of equilibrium payoffs is upper hemi-
continuous with respect to the transition function. The source of this apparent paradox can be
traced back to the fact that, in loose terms, the convergence of the set SEδ to E(M) is slowlier,
the more correlated successive states are.
The main insight to be derived from Theorem 2 is the following. The incentive compatibility
condition C2 is a very strong one. Indeed, it only requires from deviations that the distribution of
announcements matches the invariant measure. In particular, according to Theorem 2, all equilib-
ria are payoff-equivalent to equilibria in which the receiver only checks that the announcements
frequencies are consistent with m. Yet, much more sophisticated tests are available to the re-
ceiver. The receiver might, e.g., check that the empirical distribution of two-letter words (s, s′)
matches the transition function p, as in [10], or look at the distribution of three-letter words, etc.
This might potentially allow the receiver to impose weaker incentive constraints than the one in
C1, and therefore, allow for equilibrium payoffs outside of E(M). Theorem 2 thus identifies one
class of Markov chains for which this is not the case.
8 Our Theorems 1 and 2 extend to cover the case of uniform equilibrium payoffs.
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We provide below an example where the conclusion of Theorem 2 fails to hold if Assump-
tion A is not satisfied. Thus, in general, the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs does not
only depend on the invariant measure, but also on finer details of the transition function.
Example 1. Consider a game with 5 states S := {0,1,2,3,4}. The sequence of states follows a
random walk on S. When in s, the chain moves either to s + 1 (mod 5) or to s − 1 (mod 5) with
equal probabilities. The action set B of the receiver coincides with S, and the payoff function is
described in Fig. 2, where c > 1.
Thus, both players receive a payoff 1 if the action matches the current state, and 0 otherwise,
except when the receiver chooses action 1 in state 0, or action 0 in state 1.
The payoff vector (1,1) is not in E(M) as soon as c > 1. Indeed, the stationary strategy
y : A → (B) defined by y(s | s) = 1 is the only strategy such that U(μ0, y) = (1,1). But
then, the sender profits by reporting t = 1 whenever s = 0, and t = 0 whenever s = 1. On the
other hand, (1,1) is an equilibrium payoff, as soon as c < 32 , provided the players are patient
enough. Indeed, consider the strategy of the receiver in which he matches the announcement of
the sender, as long as |an+1 −an| = 1 modulo 5, and switches forever to the babbling equilibrium
(e.g., playing always b = 4) if |an+1 − an| = 1 modulo 5 for some stage n. Provided c is not too
large, the best response of the sender is to report the true state. If instead, say, the sender chooses
to report t = 1 when in fact s = 0 in a given stage, he gains c−1, but then in the next period, with
probability 12 the new state will be s = 4, and then he will either report t ∈ {0,2} and receive 0,
or report t ∈ {1,3,4} and be punished with the babbling equilibrium payoff 15 forever. Provided
the players are patient enough, such a deviation is not profitable.
In this equilibrium, the receiver checks that the one-step transitions between successive an-
nouncements are consistent with the transitions of the Markov chain. As it turns out, under
Assumption A such a sophisticated statistical analysis of the announcements is not more pow-
erful than a statistical analysis which is based only on the empirical frequencies of the different
announcements. 
Theorems 1 and 2 hold as soon as the sender knows the current state. As will be clear from the
proof, they continue to hold if the sender knows more. In particular, they hold in the extreme case
where the sender learns the entire sequence of realized states in stage 1, or in any intermediate
setup.
Note that we interpret the case δ → 1 as players being very patient. It is not possible here
to interpret it as a situation in which players would interact more frequently. Indeed, a proper
analysis of this latter case would take into account the impact on transitions: when players interact
more frequently, states become more persistent between successive interactions.
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Fig. 4. The equilibrium set in the example in Section 4.3.
4.3. An example
We here analyze a simple, specific example to show how to pin down the set of equilibrium
payoffs using our results. We let the set of states be S = {s0, s1, s2}. Between any two stages, the
state changes with probability one, and each of the two possible states is equally likely. Thus,
p(t | s) = 12 for every s = t ∈ S. Assumption A on the transition function holds and the invariant
measure assigns probability 13 to each state.
The receiver has three actions, denoted L,M and R, and the payoffs in the different states are
given by the matrix; see Fig. 3.
All extreme points of the feasible set are obtained by having the sender report truthfully the
state, and the receiver then play a pure state-dependent action. Thus, all extreme points are ob-
tained by picking one entry in each row, and averaging. For instance, picking L (resp. M , R)
in row s0 (resp. s1, s2) and averaging over states leads to a payoff of (1, 13 ). One checks that
the feasible set is the convex hull of the five payoffs (0,0), (0, 23 ), (
1
3 ,1), (
2
3 ,0) and (1,
1
3 ); see
Fig. 4.
Without any information on the state, all three actions of the receiver yield 13 , hence v
2 = 13 .
Let γ = U(μ0, y) ∈ E(M) be a limit equilibrium payoff, and denote by μ the copula obtained
when the sender exchanges the two states s1 and s2 when reporting. Thus, μ(s1, s2) = μ(s2, s1) =
μ(s0, s0) = 13 , and μ(s, t) = 0 otherwise. Since the payoffs of the two players are exchanged
in the two states s1 and s2, one has U1(μ,y) = U2(μ0, y) and U1(μ0, y) = U2(μ,y). The
incentive condition U1(μ0, y)U1(μ,y) thus yields γ 1  γ 2.
Note finally that the sum of the players’ payoffs cannot exceed 2 in state s0, and 1 in states s1
and s2. Thus, γ 1 + γ 2  13 (2 + 1 + 1) = 43 .
Hence, any equilibrium payoff (γ 1, γ 2) lies in the shaded triangle defined by the inequalities
γ 2  1 , γ 1 + γ 2  4 , γ 1  γ 2; see Fig. 4.3 3
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( 13 ,
1
3 ) is the babbling equilibrium payoff, while (
2
3 ,
2
3 ) = U(μ0, y1) and (1, 13 ) = U(μ0, y2),
where y1 : A → (B) plays L when told s0, and randomizes between M and R otherwise, while
y2 plays L, M and R in states s0, s1 and s2 respectively. As a result, the set of equilibrium payoffs
is equal to the shaded triangle in Fig. 4.
5. Proofs
5.1. Proof of Theorem 1
We here provide most details of the proof of Theorem 1. Some technical details appear
in Appendix B. Since Ê(M) = ∅, there is y0 : A → (B) such that U2(μ0, y0) > v2 and
U1(μ0, y0) > U1(μ,y0) for every μ ∈M, μ = μ0.
Let ε > 0 and U(μ0, y¯) ∈ E(M) be arbitrary, and define y := εy0 + (1−ε)y¯. It is sufficient to
prove that U(μ0, y) is arbitrarily close to some sequential equilibrium payoff of the δ-discounted
game, provided δ is high enough.
5.1.1. The strategies
Let some integer N ∈ N and a discount factor δ be given. We here define a strategy profile
(σ∗, τ∗). According to (σ∗, τ∗), the play is divided into consecutive blocks of N stages. At the
beginning of each block, players discard past information and re-start playing an N -stage profile
(σ0, τ0), where τ0 is a pure strategy. In case the receiver deviates from the pure strategy τ0, the
players switch to babbling play forever.
We now construct σ0 and τ0, starting with τ0. Consider any block of N stages. According to
τ0, the receiver “listens” to the reported state an in stage n and plays y(· | an), as long as no state
has been reported too often. As soon as this fails to be the case, the receiver substitutes the actual
report of the sender by some fictitious report θn, and plays according to y(· | θn). To be formal,
we pick a distribution mN ∈ (S) that best approximates the invariant measure m among all
distributions m˜ ∈ (S) such that Nm˜(s) is an integer for all s.
For s ∈ S and n ∈ N we denote by Nn(s) = |{k  n: ak = s}| the number of stages where the
sender reported state s, and we set
q := min{1 nN : Nn(an) > NmN(an)}
(min∅ = +∞). Intuitively, each state s ∈ S is allotted a quota of announcements equal to
NmN(s). The stage q is the first stage in which at least one of the quotas is no longer met.
From stage q until the end of the block the receiver substitutes actual reports by fictitious ones.
Formally, we let (θn) (n = 1, . . . ,N ) be a sequence such that
F1. θn = an for n < q;
F2. For each s ∈ S, the equality |{nN : θn = s}| = NmN(s) always hold;
F3. Conditional on (a1, . . . , aq), the variables (θq, . . . , θN) are deterministic.
We will refer to θn as the announcement at stage n. Condition F1 means that the announcements
coincide with the sender’s actual announcements prior to stage q; condition F2 ensures that the
entire sequence of announcements always satisfies the quotas; condition F3 ensures in particular
that the fictitious announcements are commonly known between the two players.
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The strategy σ0 is defined to be any pure best-reply strategy of the sender to τ0 in the N -stage
δ-discounted game starting in stage 1. Note that the strategy σ0 is also a best reply to τ0 on any
of the consecutive blocks of N stages, conditional on past play.10 In particular, σ∗ is a best reply
to τ∗.
5.1.2. Equilibrium properties
We here argue that for appropriate choices of N and of δ, the strategy τ∗ is a best reply to σ∗,
and that (σ∗, τ∗) induces a payoff arbitrarily close11 to U(μ0, y).
Proposition 1. For every η > 0 there exists N0 ∈ N such that the following holds: for every
N N0, there is δ0 < 1 such that for every δ  δ0 the profile (σ∗, τ∗) is a sequential equilibrium
that induces a payoff within η of U(μ0, y).
The complete proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix B.1. The crucial step consists in showing
that the fact that σ0 is a best reply to τ0 implies that with high probability σ0 reports the true state
in most stages. This is the content of Lemma 2 below. In the statement of the lemma, μσ0,τ0 is
the (expected, undiscounted) joint distribution of states and reports in a block of N stages. That
is, for each (s, a) ∈ S × S,
μσ0,τ0(s, a) := Eσ0,τ0
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
1{sn=s,θn=a}
]
is the expected frequency of the pair (s, a) over N stages (recall that the distribution of the initial
state, s1, is the invariant measure).
Lemma 2. For every η > 0 there is N0 ∈ N such that the following holds: for every N N0 there
is δ0 < 1 such that for every δ  δ0 one has
‖μσ0,τ0 −μ0‖ < η.
We will provide insights into the proof of Lemma 2 below. For the time being, we show
how to deduce Proposition 1 from Lemma 2. Observe first that by the definition of μσ0,τ0 the
expected average12 payoff induced by (σ0, τ0) over a single block is equal to U(μσ0,τ0 , y). For
fixed N , since the profile (σ∗, τ∗) consists of periodic repetitions of (σ0, τ0), the discounted
payoff induced by (σ0, τ0) converges to U(μσ0,τ0 , y) as δ → 1. In particular, it is arbitrarily
close to the target payoff U(μ0, y).
We now argue that τ∗ is a best reply to σ∗. Following any history, the continuation payoff
of the receiver is equal to the sum of his payoffs until the end of the current block and of the
continuation payoff from the next block on. The latter is equal to the discounted payoff induced
9 Indeed, denote by Xn ∼ U([0,1]) the output of the public device in stage n and label the receiver’s actions from 1
to |B|. We let the strategy τ0 instruct the receiver to choose the action b ∈ B whenever
∑b−1
i=1 y(i | θn)  Xn <∑b
i=1 y(i | θn). Thus, the device performs publicly the desired randomization.
10 This observation relies on the fact that, in the first block, σ0 is a best reply to τ0, no matter what the distribution of
the initial state s1 is.
11 Off-equilibrium-path beliefs and sequential rationality issues are discussed in Appendix B.
12 That is, when payoffs in the different stages are not discounted.
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fixed N ∈ N, this continuation payoff thus converges13 to U2(μσ0,τ0 , y) as δ → 1.
On the other hand, any deviation from τ0, say in stage n, triggers a babbling play, and the
receiver’s continuation payoff therefore does not exceed (1 − δ)∑∞k=n δk−n maxb∈B u2(pk, b),
where pk is the belief that the receiver will hold at stage k  n on the state sk at that stage. Since
the sequence of states forms an irreducible and aperiodic chain, pk converges to m. For a fixed
N ∈ N, this continuation payoff converges to v2 as δ → 1 (again, uniformly over all histories).
Since U2(μσ0,τ0 , y) > v2, this proves the best-reply property of τ0, provided first N , and
then δ, are chosen large enough.
We now turn to Lemma 2. We denote by σtruth the strategy of the sender that announces
truthfully the current state, no matter what. The proof of Lemma 2 combines several ideas.
First, by a law of large numbers for Markov chains, if N is large enough, then there is a high
probability that the realized state frequencies will be consistent with the quotas in most stages.
Thus, under (σtruth, τ0), there is a high probability that the receiver follows the announcement of
the sender in most stages. That is, the distribution μσtruth,τ0 is arbitrarily close to μ0.
Next, for a fixed N ∈ N, for every (periodic) strategy σ and viewing τ0 as a periodic strategy,
the discounted payoff γδ(σ, τ0) converges to U(μσ,τ0 , y) as δ converges to one.
Finally, the best-reply property of σ0 implies that γ 1δ (σ0, τ0) γ 1δ (σtruth, τ0).
Combining these observations, the following formal statement holds. For every ε > 0 there
exist N0 and δ0 such that for every δ  δ0 the following sequence of inequalities holds:
U1(μσ0,τ0 , y) γ 1δ (σ0, τ0)− ε  γ 1δ (σtruth, τ0)− ε U1(μσtruth,τ0 , y) − 2ε
U1(μ0, y) − 3ε. (2)
To conclude, we will rely on Lemma 3 below, which critically depends on the assumption
that U(μ0,m0) ∈ Ê(M). Denote by Me the (finite) set of extreme points of M. Recall that
μ0 ∈Me. Set
c1 := min{μe∈Me,μe =μ0}
(
U1(μ0, y0)−U1(μe, y0)
)
and c2 := max{μe∈Me,μe =μ0} ‖μe −μ0‖1,
and note that both c1 and c2 are positive.
Lemma 3. For every μ ∈M one has
U1(μ0, y) −U1(μ,y) εc1
c2
‖μ−μ0‖1.
Lemma 3 may be paraphrased as saying that any strategy that does approximately as well as
the truth-telling strategy must be telling the truth in most stages with high probability.
The conclusion of Lemma 2 follows from Eq. (2) combined with Lemma 3.
5.2. Proof of Theorem 2
We here provide insights into the proof of Theorem 2. We let δ < 1 and we fix a Nash equi-
librium (σ, τ ) of the δ-discounted game (with or without randomizing device). For clarity, we
sometimes use boldfaced letters to denote random variables.
13 Uniformly over all histories.
JID:YJETH AID:4109 /FLA [m1+; v 1.155; Prn:14/01/2013; 13:25] P.15 (1-33)
J. Renault et al. / Journal of Economic Theory ••• (••••) •••–••• 15For s ∈ S, we define y(· | s) ∈ (B) as the expected discounted distribution of moves of the
receiver in state s. Formally, for s ∈ S, and b ∈ B , we set
y(b | s) = 1
m(s)
Eσ,τ
[ ∞∑
n=1
(1 − δ)δn−11{sn=s,bn=b}
]
= Eσ,τ [
∑∞
n=1(1 − δ)δn−11{sn=s,bn=b}]
Eσ,τ [∑∞n=1(1 − δ)δn−11{sn=s}] .
By construction, one has γδ(σ, τ ) = U(μ0, y). Indeed,
γδ(σ, τ ) = (1 − δ)
∞∑
n=1
δn−1Eσ,τ
[
u(sn,bn)
]
= (1 − δ)
∞∑
n=1
δn−1
∑
s∈S,b∈B
Eσ,τ [1{sn=s,bn=b}]u(s, b)
=
∑
s∈S,b∈B
u(s, b)m(s)y(b | s) = U(μ0, y),
as desired.
Since the distribution of sn is equal to m for each stage n ∈ N, one has γ 2δ (σ, τ )  v2, and
thus U2(μ0, y) v2, so that C2 holds.
We thus need to prove that U1(μ0, y) U1(μ,y) for each μ ∈M. The idea of the proof is
rather straightforward, but the formal proof is fraught with many technical complications. Let
μ ∈M be given. We will construct a strategy σ ′ of the sender such that γδ(σ ′, τ ) = U(μ,y), so
that the desired inequality will follow from the equilibrium property of (σ, τ ).
The strategy σ ′ is designed as follows. Along the play, the sender will generate a sequence (tn)
of fictitious states that is statistically indistinguishable from the sequence (sn), and such that the
average distribution of the pair (sn, tn) is given by μ. Given such a sequence, in any stage n the
sender will play according to σ after substitute the realized state sn by the fictitious state tn. For-
mally, following any history (s1, t1, a1, b1, . . . , sn, tn) consisting of realized and fictitious states,
messages, and actions up to stage n, the strategy σ ′ plays the mixed move σ(t1, a1, b1 . . . , tn)
that would have been played by σ had the realized states been t1, . . . , tn.
We now give some more details. Since the strategy τ may feature complex statistical tests
on the successive announcements, the notion of being statistically indistinguishable has to be
interpreted in a restrictive sense.
We prove in Appendix C the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Assume Assumption A and let μ ∈M be given. There exists an S-valued process14
(tn)n such that the following hold:
P1. Conditional on sn, the vector (t1, . . . , tn) is independent of the future states (sn+1, sn+2, . . .).
P2. The law of the sequence (tn)n is the same as the law of the sequence (sn)n.
P3. The law of the pair (sn, tn) is μ for each stage n ∈ N.
P4. The conditional law of sn given t1, . . . , tn is μ(· | tn).
14 The process (tn)n is possibly defined on a probability space which is an enlargement of the one on which (sn)n is
defined.
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at stage n: past and current states, and past fictitious states. This is a feasibility requirement
that ensures that σ ′ is well defined. Condition P2 ensures that no statistical test can discriminate
between the sequences (sn) and (tn). Condition P3 provides the desired coupling between sn
and tn.
We now proceed to show that the expected payoff induced by (σ ′, τ ) is equal to U(μ,y) as
claimed. Below we will denote by sk, tk, bk generic values of the random variables sk, tk and bk ,
respectively. For any given stage n ∈ N, the following sequence of equalities holds:
Eσ ′,τ
[
u(sn,bn)
]
=
∑
sn,bn
Pσ ′,τ (sn = sn,bn = bn)u(sn, bn)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
Pσ ′,τ (sn, t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (3)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
Pσ ′,τ (sn | t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)
× Pσ ′,τ (t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (4)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
P(sn | t1, . . . , tn)Pσ ′,τ (t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (5)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
μ(sn | tn)Pσ ′,τ (t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (6)
=
∑
sn,tn,bn
μ(sn | tn)Pσ ′,τ (tn, bn)u(sn, bn), (7)
where (5) holds because the variables (b1, . . . ,bn) are conditionally independent of sn given
(t1, . . . , tn), and (6) holds by P4.
Using P2 and from the definition of σ ′, the δ-discounted sum of Pσ ′,τ (tn = tn,bn = bn) is
equal to Pσ,τ (sn = tn,bn = bn), which is equal to μ(tn)× y(bn | tn). By (7) we now obtain
γδ
(
σ ′, τ
)=∑
s,t,b
μ(s | t)μ(t)y(b | t)u(s, b) = U(μ,y).
6. Further results and comments
6.1. On the condition Ê(M) = ∅
In light of existing results for repeated games, it is not surprising that some non-empty interi-
ority assumption is needed; see [20] for a survey on the topic.
As the next example illustrates, the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails to hold if Ê(M) = ∅.
Example 2. There are two states and the receiver has two actions. The payoffs in the two states
are given by the tables in Fig. 5. We assume that the successive states are independent and that
the two states are equally likely.
The strategy which plays r irrespective of the announcement is weakly dominant in the one-
shot game, and thus, v2 = 1. Consider now the stationary strategy y defined by y(l | L) =
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Fig. 6. The game in Example 3.
y(r | R) = 1. The payoff vector U(μ0, y) = ( 34 ,1) is in E(M). However, we claim that (1,1) is
the unique equilibrium payoff, irrespective of δ. Indeed, consider any equilibrium (σ, τ ). Plainly,
the equilibrium payoff of the receiver is equal to 1. In particular, with probability 1 the receiver
plays r whenever the current state is R. This implies that in every stage and for almost every
past history, there is one (possibly history-dependent) message that is assigned positive probabil-
ity by σ following which the receiver plays r . But then the sender gets a payoff 1 by assigning
probability 1 to this specific message. 
As we stressed, the statement of Theorem 1 is unsatisfactory in one important respect: while
non-empty interior requirements in existing Folk Theorems are generically satisfied, the condi-
tion Ê(M) = ∅ does not hold generically, as the next example shows.
Example 3. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 6, where there are two states, and the receiver
has two actions. Successive states are independent and the two states are equally likely.
Here, v2 = 1, and the stationary strategy y∗ which plays l irrespective of the announcement
is the only stationary strategy that satisfies C2. Hence, E(M) contains a single payoff vector,
(1,1), and Ê(M) is empty. When payoffs are slightly perturbed, the strategy y∗ remains the
only strategy satisfying C2, therefore Ê(M) = ∅ for any such perturbation. 
Example 3 suggests that if all strategies y for which U(μ0, y) is in E(M) are constant strate-
gies, then the set Ê(M) is empty, even when payoffs in the game are slightly perturbed. We build
on this intuition, and introduce a new condition.
Condition B. There is a non-constant function y : S → (B) such that U(μ0, y) ∈ E(M).
If Condition B is not met, then all equilibrium payoffs are babbling. In Theorem 3 below we
fix the transition function of the Markov chain p and identify a game to a point in the space
R2×S×B of payoff functions.
Theorem 3. Let a game G be given.
If Condition B holds for G, then any neighborhood of G contains a game G′ with
ÊG′(M) = ∅.
If Condition B does not hold for G, there is a neighborhood N of G such that for every game
in N Condition B does not hold.
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Theorem 3 allows us to complete the picture provided by Theorems 1 and 2, provided the
underlying Markov chain satisfies Assumption A. Indeed, let G be a game. If Condition B holds
for the game G, Theorems 1 and 2 provide a characterization of the limit set of equilibrium
payoffs for games arbitrarily close to G. If Condition B does not hold for the game G, then all
games close enough to G have only babbling equilibrium payoffs.
6.2. On the role of the randomizing device
The randomizing device is not needed in the proof of Theorem 2 to implement payoffs
U(μ0, y), whenever y(· | s) is a pure strategy: it assigns probability 1 to some action b(s), for
each s ∈ S. However, as soon as y(· | s) is a truly mixed distribution for some state s, it may be
impossible to dispense with the randomizing device, as we now argue by means of an example.
Let there be two states, L and R. The successive states are drawn independently in every
period, and each of the two states is equally likely. The receiver has three actions, denoted B =
{l,m, r}. The payoffs are given in Fig. 7.
One can verify that v2 = 1. Define y∗ to be the stationary strategy such that y∗(· | R) as-
signs probability 1 to r , and y∗(· | L) assigns probabilities 23 and 13 to l and m, respectively.
Then U(μ0, y) = (2, 76 ), and one can verify that U(μ0, y∗) ∈ E(M) while Ê(M) = ∅. Thus,
using Theorem 1, the vector (2, 76 ) can be approximated by sequential equilibrium payoffs, when
players are sufficiently patient, provided a randomizing device is available.
We now assume that such a device is not available. Since successive states are independent,
the dynamic game can be viewed as a infinite repetition of the one-shot information transmis-
sion game. With this interpretation, an action of the sender in the one-shot game is a function
x : S → A, while an action of the receiver is a function y : A → B . Given an action profile (x, y),
payoffs are random and take the value u(s, y(x(s))) with probability m(s), for s ∈ S. Players then
receive the public signal (x(s), y(x(s))).
We will rely on [12]’s characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium (PPE)
payoffs in repeated games with public signals. Some care is needed, as there are two dimensions
according to which our repeated game does not fit into their setup. First, they assume that a play-
er’s payoff depends deterministically on his own action and on the public signal, while payoffs
here depend randomly on the entire action profile (x, y). Second, their result is a characterization
of public equilibrium payoffs, while we focus on sequential equilibrium payoffs.
We briefly argue that nevertheless their result applies to our setting. On the one hand, their
result is still valid for games where payoffs depend on the entire action profile.15 Next, it can
be verified that the auxiliary game in which stage payoffs are defined to be the expected stage
payoffs in our game (given the action profile) has the same set of PPE payoffs. Thus, their result
provides a characterization of the limit set of PPE payoffs for our game. On the other hand,
let (σ, τ ) be a sequential equilibrium of our game, and define a public strategy profile (σ¯ , τ¯ )
15 This can be seen from their proof or, alternatively, deduced from [16].
JID:YJETH AID:4109 /FLA [m1+; v 1.155; Prn:14/01/2013; 13:25] P.19 (1-33)
J. Renault et al. / Journal of Economic Theory ••• (••••) •••–••• 19as follows. Let any public history h¯ be given. At h¯ we let σ¯ play the expectation of the mixed
move played by σ , where the expectation is computed w.r.t. the belief held by the receiver at the
information set which contains h¯. We define τ¯ (h) by exchanging the roles of the two players. It
can be verified that (σ¯ , τ¯ ) is a public perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
Fudenberg and Levine in [12] showed16 that γ ∈ R2 is a limit PPE payoff if and only if for all
λ ∈ R2 we have λ · γ  k(λ), where k(λ) is the solution to a certain optimization problem P(λ).
We set γ = (2, 76 ) and we will show that it is not a PPE Payoff using the condition of [12]
with λ∗ = (0,1). We now recall [12]’s definition of k(λ∗), and we will show that λ∗ · γ > k(λ∗),
implying that γ is not a limit PPE payoff.
We denote by Z = A×B the set of public signals in our game. The quantity k(λ∗) is defined
as the value of the optimization problem P
supV 2,
where the supremum is taken over all (V 1,V 2) ∈ R2, and all φ : Z → R2, such that
• φ2(z) 0 for every z ∈ Z;
• (V 1,V 2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game, with payoff function defined
by ∑
s∈S
m(s)
(
u
(
s, y
(
x(s)
))+ φ(x(s), y(x(s)))), (8)
for each action pair (x, y).
Let φ : Z → R2 be any function such that φ2(z)  0 for each z ∈ Z, and let (α,β) be any
(possibly mixed) equilibrium of the one-shot game (8) with payoff (V 1,V 2). We will prove that
V 2 < 76 . We argue by contradiction, and assume that V
2  76 . We distinguish between two cases.
Assume first that α : S → (A) is pooling: the distribution of messages is the same in both
states. Then, since φ2(z) 0, the expected payoff of the receiver is not higher than
max
b∈B
∑
s∈S
m(s)u2(s, b) = 1.
Thus, V 2  1 < 76 , which is the desired contradiction.
Assume next that α is not pooling. Up to a relabeling of the messages we may then assume
w.l.o.g. that the sender always tells the truth with positive probability. That is, α(s | s) > 0 for
each s ∈ S. We denote by β˜(· | s) the conditional distribution of the receiver’s move under (α,β),
conditional on the state being s ∈ S. Denoting by s = t the two states, the equilibrium property
for the sender in the game (8) then implies that∑
b∈B
β(b | s)(u1(s, b) + φ1(s, b))∑
b∈B
β(b | t)(u1(s, b) + φ1(t, b)),
with equality if α(· | s) assigns positive probability to both messages, and∑
b∈B
β(b | t)(u1(t, b) + φ1(t, b))∑
b∈B
β(b | s)(u1(t, b) + φ1(s, b)).
16 Their result requires that a certain set have a non-empty interior, a condition that can be checked to be met here.
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u1
(
s, β˜(· | s))+ u1(t, β˜(· | t)) u1(s, β˜(· | t))+ u1(t, β˜(· | s)).
By Lemma 1, condition C2 therefore holds for the stationary strategy β˜ .
On the other hand, since φ2(z) 0 for each z, the expected payoff V 2 to the receiver does not
exceed U2(μ0, β˜). Hence, U2(μ0, β˜) 76 . This readily implies that U(μ0, β˜) ∈ E(M).
Next, one can verify that the highest payoff U2(μ0, β˜) to the receiver, over the whole set
U(μ0, β˜) ∈ E(M), is equal to 76 . In addition, the unique strategy β˜ that achieves such a payoff
is the strategy y∗. Since the supports of y∗(· | L) and y∗(· | R) are distinct, it must therefore be
that α is truth-telling: α(s | s) = 1 for each s. Therefore, β is equal to y∗.
Since V 2  76 and V 2  U2(μ0, y∗), one also has V 2 = U2(μ0, y∗). In particular, the expec-
tation of φ2(z) under the equilibrium profile (α,β) must be equal to zero. Since φ2(z)  0 for
each z, this implies that φ2(z) = 0, for each public signal z that receives positive probability
under (α,β).
Using this, we finally claim that the equilibrium condition for the receiver in the game
(8) is violated. Indeed, when told L, the strategy β = y∗ assigns positive probability to both
l and m. Hence, φ2(L, l) = φ2(L,m) = 0 by the previous paragraph. On the other hand,
u2(L,m) > u2(L, l), hence the receiver is not indifferent between both actions. This is the de-
sired contradiction.
6.3. Imperfect monitoring
Let us assume here that successive states are independent. Results continue to hold if the
receiver only observes a noisy, public version of the sender’s message, provided the definition of
U(μ,y) is modified in an appropriate way. They still hold if the receiver observes a noisy, public
signal of the current state, provided the individual rationality level v2 is modified in the proper
way. They also hold, without changes, if the sender only observes a noisy, public signal of the
receiver’s action. What happens in any of these variants when signals are private is beyond the
scope of the paper.
We briefly conclude this section by discussing the case where the sender fails to receive any
information relative to the receiver’s choices. In spite of this feature, the game does not reduce to
a sequence of successive, independent, one-shot games, because of the ability of the receiver to
monitor the sender. In particular, it is easy to construct examples with equilibrium payoffs that
lie outside of the convex hull of the set of equilibrium payoffs in the one-shot game.
We refer to the game where the sender does not observe the actions of the receiver as the blind
game. Denote by NEbδ the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the blind game. We prove that
the value of monitoring is positive, in the sense that allowing the sender to monitor the receiver
has a non-ambiguous effect on the equilibrium set.
Proposition 2. The set NEbδ is a subset of NEδ .
Proof. Let (σ, τ ) be a Nash equilibrium of the blind game. Define τ ′ to be the following strategy
that depends only on the sender’s announcements, and not on the receiver’s past actions: after a
sequence (a1, . . . , an) of announcements, τ ′ plays any action b ∈ B with the probability that the
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n-th action of the receiver according to τ is b, conditional on the sender’s announcements being
(a1, . . . , an):
τ ′(a1, . . . , an)[b] = E
[
τ(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . . , bn−1, an)[b] | a1, a2, . . . , an
]
.
In words, τ ′ gets rid of the possible correlation between successive actions of the receiver, that
may exist in the strategy τ .
We claim that the strategy profile (σ, τ ′) is a Nash equilibrium of the blind game. Indeed, τ ′
is a best reply to σ because it induces the same payoff as τ . σ is a best reply to τ ′ because any
strategy of the sender in the blind game induces the same expected payoff against τ or τ ′.
We next claim that the strategy profile (σ, τ ′) is a Nash equilibrium of the non-blind game.
Indeed, because under σ , the sender does not condition his play on past actions of the receiver,
and because τ ′ is a best response to σ in the blind game, it follows that τ ′ is a best response to
σ in the non-blind game as well. Because the receiver’s actions are conditionally independent,
given the sender’s announcements, any profitable deviation against τ ′ in the non-blind game is
also profitable in the blind game. 
The inclusion is strict in general, as Example 4 below shows.
Example 4. There are two states S = {L,R}, and three actions for the receiver, B = {l,m, r}.
Successive states are independent and the two states are equally likely. The payoffs in the two
states are given in Fig. 8.
We claim that (2,2) is an equilibrium payoff when the sender observes the actions of the
receiver, but it is no longer an equilibrium payoff when the sender does not observe the receiver’s
actions.
Note first that v2 = 32 , and that Ê(M) = ∅. By Theorem 1, (2,2) ∈ E(M), so that (2,2) ∈
lim infδ→1 SEδ ⊆ lim infδ→1 NEδ .
We now argue that (2,2) is bounded away from the set NEbδ . Indeed, assume to the contrary
that there is some equilibrium profile (σ, τ ) of the blind game with a payoff close to (2,2). In
particular, with a probability close to one, there is a positive fraction of the stages in which the
current state is R and the receiver plays m. Consider the strategy τ ′ which plays as τ , except that
τ ′ plays r whenever τ would play m. Because the sender does not observe the receiver’s actions,
he cannot tell whether the receiver uses τ or τ ′, and therefore τ ′ is a profitable deviation of the
receiver: it yields the receiver payoff close to 2 12 . 
6.4. Relation to the one-shot game
The characterization implies that every equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game remains an
equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game, provided players are patient enough. This property is
not obvious a priori, since the game is not a repeated game. In particular, it would typically fail
to hold if the state were constant throughout the play.
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egy defined as
y(b | a) =
∑
s∈S
σ (a | s)τ (a)[b].
Note that the expected payoff under (σ, τ ) is U(μ0, y). We claim that U(μ0, y) ∈ E(M), so that
by Theorem 1 it is a sequential equilibrium payoff in the repeated game. Indeed, because the
receiver can guarantee v2 in the one-shot game, condition C2 holds. Because σ is a best reply
to τ in the one-shot game, the inequality in C1 holds for every μ, and in particular for every
μ ∈M.
This result has the implication that the lowest equilibrium payoff of the sender in the repeated
game cannot be higher than his lowest equilibrium payoff in the one shot game. As the example
in Section 3 shows, it can in fact be strictly lower.
On the other hand, the lowest equilibrium payoff of the receiver in both the one-shot game
and the repeated game is equal to his babbling equilibrium payoff v2.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1 we need the following description of M, which is of independent interest.
A permutation matrix is a (square) matrix with entries in {0,1}, such that each row and each
column contains exactly one entry equal to 1. We denote by Φ the set of S × S permutation
matrices, and by I the matrix that corresponds to the identity permutation.
Lemma 5. The set M(m) is equal to
M(m) = (μ0 − I + coΦ) ∩ RS×S+ .
Proof. The inclusion ⊇ is clear. We prove the reverse inclusion. Take μ in M(m), and define
the matrix J := μ+ I −μ0 in RS×S . J is a bistochastic matrix, hence it is a convex combination
of permutation matrices. Since μ = J − I +μ0, the result follows. 
Proof of Lemma 1. We only prove that C1 is equivalent to C’1. For every permutation φ over S
denote by μφ ∈ S×S the matrix where the entry (s, t) is equal to 1 if t = φ(s), and is 0 otherwise.
Note that U1(I, y) =∑s∈S u1(s, y(· | s)), and U1(μφ, y) =∑s∈S u1(s, y(· | φ(s))).
Assume first that C’1 holds, and let μ ∈M(m). By Lemma 5, μ can be written μ = μ0 − I +∑
φ αφP
φ
, where the αφ are non-negative real numbers that sum to one. Because U1 is linear
in μ,
U1(μ,y) = U1(μ0, y) −U1(I, y)+
∑
φ
αφU
1(μφ,y).
By C’1, U1(I, y)U1(μφ, y) for every permutation φ, and therefore
U1(I, y)
∑
φ
αφU
1(μφ, y).
It follows that U1(μ0, y)  U1(μ,y). Because this inequality holds for every μ ∈ M(μ),
C1 holds.
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Because m has full support, one has με ∈M(m) provided ε is sufficiently small. Now, by C1, it
follows that for each such ε,
U1(μ0, y)U1(με, y) = U1(μ0, y) − εU1(I, y)+ εU1
(
μφ,y
)
.
We conclude that U1(μφ, y) εU1(I, y). As this inequality holds for every permutation φ, C’1
holds. 
Appendix B. Complements to the proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 given in the text is almost complete. For completeness we provide
below the proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 3, which are missing.
We start by addressing the issue of designing a system of beliefs for the receiver that is con-
sistent with σ∗ and that satisfies an additional property. Since the game involves randomizing
devices with uncountably many outcomes, the standard definition of consistency does not apply.
We denote by λ ∈ (S) a distribution with full support and, for η < 0, we denote by ση the
strategy that, following any history hn, plays ηλ+ (1 − η)σ∗(hn).
One can check that for η > 0 the beliefs of the receiver are uniquely defined by Bayes rule,
and have a limit17 when η = 0. Note that following any history that is inconsistent with τ0, the
belief of the receiver in stage n is independent18 of tn.
We denote by τ∗ a strategy that coincides with τ0 as long as the sender does not deviate,
and that plays in each later stage n an action that (i) maximizes the current expected payoff of
the receiver given the belief held by the receiver in stage n, and (ii) does not depend on the
announcements made by the sender since the deviation took place.
By construction, the strategy σ∗ is sequentially rational at each information set of the sender,
while the strategy τ∗ is sequentially rational at each information set of the receiver that is incon-
sistent with τ0.
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Assume w.l.o.g. that all payoffs belong to the interval [0,1]. Define by σtruth the strategy of
the sender that announces truthfully the current state sn in each stage n  N , and by τtruth the
strategy of the receiver that plays y(tn) in each stage nN . Thus, τtruth coincides with τ0 until
stage q .
Let η be given and set ξ = η|S|+2 . For every state s ∈ S and every n ∈ N denote by Fn(s)
the empirical frequency of visits to s up to (and including) stage n. Since the Markov chain is
aperiodic, by the ergodic theorem there is N0 such that with probability at least 1 − ξ , we have
F(1−ξ)N (s)  mN(S) for every state s ∈ S for every N  N0. It follows that τ0 coincides with
τtruth in the first (1 − ξ)N stages, so that with probability at least 1 − ξ ,
‖μσtruth,τ0 − μ0‖1  |S|ξ.
This implies that
U1(μσtruth,τ0, y) > U
1(μ0, y) −
(|S| + 1)ξ.
17 And the convergence is uniform w.r.t. the receiver’s information set.
18 That is, should the sender fail to play the babbling announcement a¯, the receiver sill interprets the sender’s announce-
ments as babbling.
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average payoff in that block, and therefore for δ sufficiently large
γ 1δ (σtruth, τ0) > U
1(μ0, y) −
(|S| + 2)ξ.
Because σ0 is a best reply to τ0, we deduce that
γ 1δ (σ0, τ0) γ 1δ (σtruth, τ0) > U1(μ0, y) −
(|S| + 2)ξ = U1(μ0, y) − η.
We again use the fact that for a fixed N ∈ N, as δ goes to 1, the payoff γδ(σ0, τ0) converges to
U(μσ0,τ0, y) to deduce that
U1(μσ0,τ0 , y) > U
1(μ0, y) − η. (9)
For a fixed N ∈ N, and for every δ, the marginal distributions of μσ0,τ0 ∈ (S × A) on S and
A are respectively equal to m and to mN .
Since the approximation mN converges to m as N → +∞, the distribution μσ0,τ0 converges
to the set M of copulas. Using Lemma 3, Proposition 1 therefore follows from (9).
B.2. Proof of Lemma 3
Let a copula μ ∈ M be given. Present μ as a convex combination of the extreme points
(μe)e of M: μ =∑μe∈Me αeμe, with αe  0 and ∑μe∈Me αe = 1. Recall that μ0 is one of the
extreme points of M.
On the one hand, since U1 is bi-linear, one has
U1(μ0, y) −U1(μ,y) = εU1(μ0, y0)+ (1 − ε)U1(μ0, y1)− εU1(μ,y0)
− (1 − ε)U1(μ,y1)
 ε
(
U1(μ0, y0)−U1(μ,y0)
) (10)
= ε
(
(1 − α0)U1(μ0, y0)−
∑
μe =μ0
αeU
1(μe, y0)
)
(11)
 ε(1 − α0)c1, (12)
where the inequality (10) holds because y1 ∈ Y(M) and by C1.
On the other hand one has μ −μ0 =∑μe∈Me αe(μe −μ0), hence
‖μ−μ0‖1  c2
∑
μe∈Me,μe =μ0
αe = c2(1 − α0). (13)
The result follows from (12) and (13).
Appendix C. Complements to the proof of Theorem 2
We here prove Lemma 4. For clarity, we introduce yet another copy T of the set S. Intuitively,
fictitious states are T -valued, while realized ones are S-valued.
DefineM′ ⊆ (S×T ) to be the set of distributions μ ∈M such that the following Property P
holds:
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s′∈S
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t)p(s ∣∣ s′)= ∑
t ′∈T
μ
(
s
∣∣ t ′)p(t ′ ∣∣ t). (14)
We will prove
Lemma 6. Under Assumption A, the set M′ coincides with the set M.
Lemma 7. Let μ ∈M′ be given. There exists an S-valued process19 (tn)n, such that the following
hold:
P1. The law of the sequence (tn)n is the same as the law of the sequence (sn)n.
P2. The law of the pair (sn, tn) is μ for each stage n ∈ N.
P3. The conditional law of sn given t1, . . . , tn is μ(· | tn).
P4. Conditional on sn, the vector (t1, . . . , tn) is independent of the future states (sn+1, sn+2, . . .).
We emphasize that only Lemma 6 makes use of Assumption A. This has the following con-
sequence. Given μ ∈M′, using Lemma 7 and the construction presented in the paper, one has
U1(μ0, y)  U1(μ,y). Thus, the conclusion U1(μ0, y) = maxμ∈M′ U1(μ,y) holds, irrespec-
tive of whether Assumption A is met or not.
C.1. Proof of Lemma 7
Let μ ∈M′ be given, and define μ¯ ∈ (T × S × T ) by
μ¯
(
t ′, s, t
)= μ(s, t)p(t ∣∣ t ′)m(t ′)
m(t)
,
(
t ′, s, t
) ∈ T × S × T . (15)
For every two indices i, j ∈ {1,2,3} with i < j denote by μ¯i,j the marginal of μ¯ on the i-th and
j -th coordinates.
We will use the following properties of μ¯.
Lemma 8. One has
1. μ¯2,3 = μ;
2. μ¯1,3(t ′, t) = m(t ′)p(t | t ′) for every t, t ′ ∈ T ;
3. μ¯1,2(t ′, s′) =∑s∈S μ¯2,3(s, t ′)p(s′ | s), for each t ′ ∈ T , s′ ∈ S;
4. μ¯(s | t ′, t) = μ(s | t) for each (t ′, s, t) ∈ T × S × T .
Proof. We prove the four claims in turn. Let s, t ∈ S × T be given. One has
μ¯2,3(s, t) =
∑
t ′∈T
μ¯
(
t ′, s, t
)= ∑
t ′∈T
μ(s, t)p
(
t
∣∣ t ′)m(t ′)
m(t)
19 The process (tn)n is possibly defined on a probability space which is an enlargement of the one on which (sn)n is
defined.
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m(t)
∑
t ′∈T
p
(
t
∣∣ t ′)m(t ′)= μ(s, t),
which proves the first claim.
To prove the second claim fix t ′, t ∈ T . One has
μ¯1,3
(
t ′, t
)=∑
s∈S
μ¯
(
t ′, s, t
)=∑
s∈S
μ(s, t)p
(
t
∣∣ t ′)m(t ′)
m(t)
= p(t ∣∣ t ′)m(t ′),
where the last equality holds since the marginal distribution of μ on S is m.
We turn to the third claim. Let t ′ ∈ T , s′ ∈ S be given. By the first claim and since μ ∈M′
one has∑
s∈S
μ¯2,3
(
s, t ′
)
p
(
s′
∣∣ s)=∑
s∈S
μ
(
s, t ′
)
p
(
s′
∣∣ s)= m(t ′)∑
t∈T
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t)p(t ∣∣ t ′). (16)
On the other hand,
μ¯1,2
(
t ′, s′
)=∑
t∈T
μ¯
(
t ′, s′, t
)=∑
t∈T
μ
(
s′, t
)
p
(
t
∣∣ t ′)m(t ′)
m(t)
. (17)
The third claim follows from (16) and (17).
Finally let (t ′, s, t) ∈ T × S × T be given. By the second claim,
μ¯
(
s
∣∣ t ′, t)= μ¯(t ′, s, t)
μ1,3(t ′, t)
= μ(s, t)p(t | t
′)
p(t | t ′)m(t ′) ×
m(t ′)
m(t)
= μ(s | t),
and the fourth claim follows. 
We construct the sequence (tn)n as follows. The initial values t0 and t1 are drawn according
to the conditional distribution μ¯(·|s1) ∈ (T × T ). For n = 2, tn is drawn according to the
conditional distribution μ¯(· | tn−1, sn). In this construction, t0 is used to unify the treatment of s1
with that of (sn)n2. Property P4 thus holds by construction. Properties P1 and P2 follow from
the next lemma.
Lemma 9. The law of (tn−1, sn, tn) is equal to μ¯, for each stage n 1.
Proof. We argue by induction. Observe that the law of s1 is equal to m. Therefore,
P
(
(t0, s1, t1) =
(
t ′, s, t
))= m(s)μ¯(t ′, t ∣∣ s)= μ¯(t ′, s, t).
Assume that the claim holds for some n ∈ N. We will prove that the law of (tn, sn+1) is equal to
μ¯1,2. This follows from the following sequence of equalities, which holds for every t ′ ∈ T , s ∈ S:
P
(
(tn, sn+1) =
(
t ′, s
))=∑
s′∈S
P
(
(sn, tn, sn+1) =
(
s′, t ′, s
))
=
∑
s′∈S
P
(
(sn, tn) =
(
s′, t ′
))× P(sn+1 = s|(sn, tn) = (s′, t))
=
∑
s′∈S
μ¯2,3
(
s′, t ′
)
p
(
s
∣∣ s′)= μ¯1,2(t ′, s),
where the last equality follows from Lemma 8(3) and P4. Since the conditional law of tn+1 given
(tn, sn+1) is equal to μ¯(· | tn, sn+1), this yields the claim for n+ 1. 
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lemma is needed to the proof of the second part.
Lemma 10. (1) The conditional law of tn given (t0, . . . , tn−1) coincides with the conditional law
of tn given tn−1.
(2) The conditional law of sn given (t0, . . . , tn−1, tn) coincides with the conditional law of sn
given tn.
Proof. The proof is by induction. For n = 1, the first statement trivially holds, while the second
statement holds by Lemma 8(1). Assume that the claim holds for some n ∈ N. For brevity, we
denote by tn, sn, . . . generic values of tn, sn · · · and we write P(tn, sn) instead of P((tn, sn) =
(tn, sn)).
Observe first that by the definition of (tn),
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn+1∈S
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn, sn+1)
=
∑
sn+1∈S
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)× μ¯(tn+1 | tn, sn+1). (18)
Moreover,
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | t0, . . . , tn)P(sn+1 | sn, t0, . . . , tn)
=
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | t0, . . . , tn)× p(sn+1 | sn)
=
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | tn) × p(sn+1 | sn), (19)
where the last equality holds by the induction hypothesis. Note that the right-hand side of (19) is
independent of (t0, t1, . . . , tn−1), and therefore
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) = P(sn+1 | tn). (20)
Plugging (19) in (18), one obtains
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn+1∈S
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | tn)× p(sn+1 | sn)× μ¯(tn+1 | tn, sn+1).
The right-hand side is independent of t1, . . . , tn−1, hence it is equal to P(tn+1 | tn), and the first
part of the lemma follows.
We turn to the second statement. One has
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn+1) = P(sn+1, tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)
= P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)× P(tn+1 | sn+1, t0, . . . , tn)
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)
= P(sn+1 | tn)μ¯(tn+1 | sn+1, tn)P(tn+1 | tn)
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μ¯(tn, sn+1)
m(tn)
m(tn+1)
= μ(sn+1, tn+1)
m(tn+1)
= P(sn+1 | tn+1),
where the third equality holds by (20), the construction of (tn)n, and the first claim, and the fourth
equality holds by (15). This concludes the proof of the induction step. 
The proof of Lemma 7 is now completed.
C.2. Proof of Lemma 6
We here verify that if Assumption A holds then M=M′. Let p be a transition function such
that p(s′ | s) = αs′ for every two states s = s′, and p(s | s) = 1 −∑s′ =s αs′ . Set C =∑s∈S αs .
One can verify that the invariant measure of p is given by m(s) = αs
C
for each s ∈ S.
Let μ ∈M. We will prove that for every (t, s′) ∈ T × S, the equality∑
s∈S
μ(s | t)p(s′ ∣∣ s)= ∑
t ′∈T
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)p(t ′ ∣∣ t) (21)
holds. Fix t ∈ T and s′ ∈ S. Observe that∑
s∈S
μ(s | t)p(s′ ∣∣ s)= μ(s′ ∣∣ t)(1 −∑
s =s′
αs
)
+
∑
s =s′
αs′μ(s | t)
= μ(s′ ∣∣ t)(1 −∑
s =s′
αs
)
+ αs′
(
1 −μ(s′ ∣∣ t))
= αs′ +μ
(
s′
∣∣ t)(1 − C). (22)
We also have∑
t ′∈T
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)p(t ′ ∣∣ t)= μ(s′ ∣∣ t)(1 −∑
t ′ =t
αt ′
)
+
∑
t ′ =t
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)αt ′ (23)
= μ(s′ ∣∣ t)(1 −C + αt )+∑
t ′ =t
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)αt ′ . (24)
Subtracting (23) from (22) one obtains∑
s∈S
μ(s | t)p(s′ ∣∣ s)−∑
t ′∈T
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)p(t ′ ∣∣ t)= αs′ −μ(s′ ∣∣ t)αt −∑
t ′ =t
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)αt ′
= αs′ −
∑
t ′∈S
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)αt ′
= αs′ −C
∑
t ′∈S
μ
(
s′
∣∣ t ′)m(t ′)
= αs′ −Cm
(
s′
)= 0, (25)
where (25) and (25) hold since α(s) = Cm(s) for every s ∈ S. This proves (21), as desired.
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The proof of Theorem 3 consists of two independent parts. We first prove that if Condition B
does not hold for some game G, then it does not hold throughout some neighborhood of G.
Proposition 3. Let G be a game that does not satisfy Condition B. Then there is a neighborhood
N of G such that no game in N satisfies Condition B.
Proof. The proof relies on the theory of semi-algebraic sets. We refer to [7] for the results used
below. Recall that the set of extreme points of the polytope M is denoted by Me.
We will use the following two properties, that hold for constant functions y : S → (B).
R1. If y : S → (B) is constant, then U1(μ0, y) = U1(μ,y) for every μ ∈M.
R2. If y : S → (B) is constant, then U2(μ0, y) v2.
Property R1 holds because when y is constant the payoff is independent of the sender’s an-
nouncements. Property R2 holds because v2 is the maximum of U2(μ0, y) over all constant
functions y.
Given a payoff function u˜ : S × B → R2, we denote by S(u˜) the system of inequalities
U˜2(μ0, y) v2u˜ and U˜
1(μ0, y) U˜1(μ,y), for all μ ∈Me,
with unknowns y : S → (B), where v2
u˜
= maxb∈B U˜2(μ0, b) is the minmax value of the re-
ceiver in the game with payoffs u˜.
We say that a vector y ∈ RS×B is constant if y(s, b) only depends on b.
Let u denote the payoff function of G. By assumption, any solution y to S(u) is constant.
We will show that this implies that all solutions to S(u˜) are constant, for all u˜ in a neighborhood
of u.
Assume to the contrary that for every ε > 0 there is a payoff function uε ∈ R2(S×B) such that
(i) ‖u− uε‖ < ε, and (ii) the system S(uε) has a non-constant solution yε ∈ RS×B .
This implies that there is a semi-algebraic function ε ∈ (0,1) → (uε, yε) such that
(i) limε→0 uε = u, and (ii) yε is a non-constant solution to S(uε) for every ε > 0 small enough.
In particular, the function ε → yε has an expansion to a Puiseux series in a neighborhood of
zero: there exist ε0 > 0, a natural number r , and vectors yk ∈ RS×B for k  0 such that
yε =
∞∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk,
for every ε ∈ (0, ε0), and a similar expansion exists for the function ε → uε .
Note that y0 = limε→0 yε . This implies in particular that y0(·, s) ∈ (B) for every s ∈ S, and
that y0 is a solution to S(u). In particular, y0 is constant.
Because yε(·, s) ∈ (B), it follows that ∑b∈B yε(b | s) = 1 for every ε > 0 and every s ∈ S,
so that
∑
b∈B yk(b | s) = 0 for every k  1 and every s ∈ S.
Let l  0 be the maximal integer such that y0, y1, . . . , yl are constant functions. Because yε is
not constant for every ε > 0, we have l < ∞. Define a vector d ∈ RB by
d(b) = minyl+1(b, s), ∀b ∈ B.s∈S
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yε =
∞∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk =
(
l∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk + ε l+1r d
)
+ ε l+1r (yl+1 − d)+
∞∑
k=l+2
ε
k
r yk. (26)
The first term (
∑l
k=0 ε
k
r yk + ε l+1r d) is independent of s, and all its coordinates are non-negative
because yε is non-negative for every ε > 0. Set
zε =
∑l
k=0 ε
k
r yk + ε l+1r d
1 + ε l+1r ∑b∈B d(b) ∈ RS×B.
Then zε(·, s) ∈ (B) for every s ∈ S, and zε is independent of s. Set
w(·, s) = yl+1(·, s) − d−∑b∈B d(b) ∈ RS×B, ∀s ∈ S.
Then w(s) ∈ (B) and w is non-constant. We will show that w solves S(u), contradicting the
assumption that all solutions of S(u) are constant.
By R2, for every ε > 0 we have U˜2(μ0, zε) v2uε . But U˜
2(μ0, yε) v2uε and yε is a convex
combination of zε , w, and a “tail” which is of a lower order of ε; by taking the limit ε → 0 and
using v2uε → v2 we obtain U2(μ0,w) v2.
Fix μ ∈ Me. By R1 it follows that U˜1(μ0, zε) = U˜1(μ, zε). Because U˜1(μ0, yε) 
U˜1(μ,yε), it follows for the same reasoning as above that U1(μ0,w)U1(μ,w). 
We turn to the second part of the proof.
Proposition 4. Let G be a game such that Condition B holds. Then any neighborhood of the
game G contains a game G′ such that ÊG′(M) = ∅.
Proof. The proof combines three independent lemmas. We first show that there are perturbations
of u2 such that the inequality in (i) holds strictly for the perturbed game. Next, we show that the
function y may be assumed to be one-to-one. Finally, we construct perturbations of u1 such that
the inequalities in (ii) will be strict.
Lemma 11. Let G be a game with payoff function u and let y : S → (B) be a non-constant
function such that U2(μ0, y)  v2. Then any neighborhood of u2 contains payoff functions u˜2
such that U˜2(μ0, y) > v˜2.
Proof. Define P ∈ (S×B) by P(s, b) := m(s)y(b | s) for every s ∈ S and b ∈ B , and let ε > 0
be given. We abuse notations and still denote by P the two marginals of P over S and B . Note
that P(s) = m(s) > 0 for each s ∈ S. Define u˜2 : S ×B → R by u˜2(s, b) = u2(s, b) if P(b) = 0,
and
u˜2(s, b) = u2(s, b) + ε P (s, b)
P (s)P (b)
if P(b) > 0.
We claim that U˜2(μ0, y) > v˜2. Since ε is arbitrary, the result will follow. Note first that for
every b ∈ B that satisfies P(b) > 0 one has
U˜2(μ0, b) = U2(μ0, b) + ε
∑
m(s)
P (s, b)
m(s)P (b)
= U2(b,μ0)+ ε.s∈S
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m(s)
= P(s,b)
P (s)
= P(b | s),
U˜2(μ0, y) = U2(μ0, y) + ε
∑
s∈S,b∈B
m(s)y(b | s) P (s, b)
P (s)P (b)
= U2(μ0, y) + ε
∑
s∈S
m(s)
∑
b∈B
P (b | s)2
P(b)
.
Viewed as a function of the probability distribution q ∈ (B), the expression ∑b∈B (q(b))2P(b) is
strictly convex, and admits a unique minimum equal to 1 when q = P . Thus, for every fixed state
s ∈ S one has ∑b∈B P(b|s)2P(b)  1 with a strict inequality whenever the conditional distribution
P(· | s) differs from P . Since y is not constant, there exists at least one state s such that P(· |
s) = P . Therefore,
U˜2(μ0, y) > U
2(μ0, y) + ε  v2 + ε = v˜2,
as desired. 
Lemma 12. Let G be a game with payoff function u and let y : S → (B) be such that
U1(μ0, y) U1(μ,y) for each μ ∈M. Then any neighborhood of y in RS×B contains a one-
to-one function y˜ : S → (B) such that U1(μ0, y˜)U1(μ, y˜) for each μ ∈M.
Proof. It suffices to show the existence of a one-to-one function z˜ : S → (B) such that
U1(μ0, z˜)  U1(μ, z˜) for each μ ∈M. Indeed, the conclusion of the lemma then follows by
setting y˜ = (1 − ε)y + εz˜ for ε > 0 small enough.
Let (zs)s∈S be arbitrary distinct elements of (B). Let φ˜ be a permutation over S that maxi-
mizes the sum
∑
s∈S u1(s, zψ(s)) over all permutations ψ and set z˜s = zφ˜(s) for every s ∈ S. By
construction one has∑
s∈S
u1(s, z˜s)
∑
s∈S
u1(s, z˜φ(s)),
for every permutation φ over S. By Lemma 1, this implies U1(μ0, z˜) U1(μ, z˜) for every μ ∈
M, as desired. 
Lemma 13. Let G be a game with payoff function u and let y : S → (B) be a one-to-one func-
tion such that U1(μ0, y)  U1(μ,y) for each μ ∈M. Then any neighborhood of u1 contains
payoff functions u˜1 such that U˜1(μ0, y) > U˜1(μ,y) for each μ ∈M, μ = μ0.
Note that the existence of a stationary strategy y that satisfies the requirements follows from
Lemma 12.
Proof. Let G, u and y be as stated. Given ε > 0 we define u˜1 : S × B → R by
u˜1(s, b) = u1(s, b) + εy(b | s).
We will prove that for every ε > 0 one has U˜1(μ0, y) > U˜1(μ,y) for each μ ∈M \ {μ0}.
Given a permutation φ over S we denote by Yφ ∈ RS×B the vector whose (s, b)-component is
equal to y(b | φ(s)). Then,
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s∈S
u˜1
(
s, y
(· ∣∣ φ(s)))= ∑
s∈S,b∈B
y
(
b
∣∣ φ(s))u˜(s, b) (27)
=
∑
s∈S,b∈B
y
(
b
∣∣ φ(s))u(s, b) + ε ∑
s∈S,b∈B
y
(
b
∣∣ φ(s))y(b | s) (28)
=
∑
s∈S
u1
(
s, y
(· ∣∣ φ(s)))+ ε〈YId,Yφ〉, (29)
where 〈YId,Yφ〉 =∑s∈S,b∈B y(b | φ(s))y(b | s) is the standard scalar product in RS×B .
Since y is one-to-one, the vectors Yφ and YId are not co-linear as soon as φ = Id . By Cauchy–
Schwarz inequality, it follows that
〈YId,Yφ〉 < ‖YId‖2‖Yφ‖2 = ‖YId‖2 = 〈YId,YId〉 (30)
where the first equality holds since the components of Yφ are obtained by permuting the compo-
nents of YId .
By Lemma 1 one has∑
s∈S
u1
(
s, y
(· ∣∣ φ(s)))∑
s∈S
u1
(
s, y(· | s)). (31)
Plugging (31) into (27), one obtains∑
s∈S
u˜1
(
s, y
(· ∣∣ φ(s)))<∑
s∈S
u1
(
s, y(· | s))+ 〈YId,YId〉 =∑
s∈S
u˜1
(
s, y(· | s)).
By Lemma 1 this yields U˜1(μ0, y) > U˜1(μ,y) for every μ ∈M, μ = μ0, as desired. 
The proof of Proposition 4 follows from Lemmas 11, 12 and 13.
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